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PERSONAL VS. BUSINESS EXPENSES:
A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR
KLEIN'S APPROACH
William D. Popkint
In a recent issue of the Cornell Law Review, Professor Klein grapples with some of the problems surrounding the deductibility of commuting expenses.1 I would like to question some of the premises on
which he proceeds, primarily part I on "The 'Motivation' Test" and
'2
part III on "Equity."

First, Professor Klein raises doubts about the concept of personal
motives as a "cause" for incurring an expense and the role this concept
can play in distinguishing between non-deductible personal and deductible business expenses. He states that personal motivation cannot
be the sole cause of commuting expenses because the decision to work
also contributed to incurring the expenses.3 Causation, therefore, is not
the "relevant issue," and reference to it is "futile" because both deduction-generating (choice of job) and non-deduction-generating (choice
4
of residential location) conditions are present.
Second, he suggests that the personal-business dichotomy is a "blindalley" for identifying the equitable result in the context of commuting
expenses.5 Instead, he proposes an analytical model for deciding how
equitable considerations can be applied to determine whether an expense should be deductible. His model requires deciding whether
commuting costs are likely to be only an added burden for the resident
which provides him no added psychic satisfaction when compared to
taxpayers in residence locations with lesser or no commuting expenses.6
I suggest that Professor Klein's discussion obscures the continued
usefulness of the concept of personal motives as a "cause" in the context of commuting expenses and, more generally, in distinguishing
between deductible business expenses and non-deductible personal
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University. A.B. 1958 LL.B. 1961, Harvard
University.
I Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses: Tax Policy and the Need for
Nonsimplistic Analysis of "Simple" Problems, 54 CoNaLL L. REv. 871 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Klein].
2 Id. at 874-79, 883-94.
3 Id. at 876.
4 Id. at 890.
5 Id. at 889.
6 Id. at 883-90.
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expenses; and that tax policy decisions would be better made if Professor Klein's analytical model were not given the significant role he
suggests for it. These two points are discussed under the headings
"Cause" and "Equity."
I
CAUSE

Apparently, the difficulty with characterizing personal motivation
as the "sole cause" of commuting expense arises because the taxpayer
must engage in business before the expenses can be incurred. This
leads Professor Klein to say that both a business and a personal purpose
7
exist.
As Professor Klein points out, commuting expenses cannot be analogized to food expenses which, although they have a business utility
in keeping the taxpayer alive, are personal expenses because they
would have been incurred for personal reasons even if there were no
business activity.8 However, the relationship between personal motivation and commuting expenses still makes it useful to refer to personal reasons as the sole cause, assuming at this point, as does Professor
Klein,9 that a man is both psychologically free to choose his personal
residence and practically able to do so because of the availability of
housing. If the entire commuting expense can be avoided but is not
avoided because of a personal decision to live beyond walking distance,
it is proper to conclude that it is incurred solely for personal reasons.
Professor Klein suggests that this analysis is faulty because personally motivated failure to keep a business-required expense to a
minimum has not led to a disallowance of the deduction. He cites as
one example the purchase of a first-class, rather than a coach, airline
ticket for a business trip.10 However, the reason for allowing the deduction for the extra expense of the ticket is not that the avoidable
portion of the expense is not a personal expense, but that it is administratively burdensome to identify that portion of the expense which
7 Id. at 890.
8 Id. at 876. A similar analysis supports the non-deductibility of child care and

medical expenses as business expenses. It is usually assumed that they would be incurred
for personal reasons in any event. But see Reginald Denny, 33 B.T.A. 738 (1935) (medical
'expense as business expense). Section 214 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows
child care expenses to be deducted under circumstances that decrease the likelihood they
would have been incurred in any event for personal reasons.
9 Klein at 876-77.
10 Id. at 878.
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results from personal choice. The Treasury Department once asserted
that the portion of food expenses incurred away from home which
equalled food expenses which would have been incurred at home was
a non-deductible personal expense; but it abandoned the attempt to
identify this amount for administrative reasons. 1 Similarly, it seems
too burdensome to require the Internal Revenue Service to check
whether coach tickets were available when the reservations were made.
However, if administrative problems were absent, the amount of the
expense that was avoidable but was not avoided for personal reasons
would properly be treated as a non-deductible personal expense.
This analysis distinguishes the commuting expenses from "true"
dual purpose expenses whose incurrence is motivated by a mixture of
business and personal reasons. There are situations where an expense
is incurred only if there is a business and where no specific portion
of the expense is avoidable, but where it is nonetheless clear that the
expense is motivated to a significant degree by personal considerations.
In these situations, if the danger that personal satisfaction will be purchased with deductible business expenses becomes too great, measures
must be taken to disallow all or a portion of the deduction. The degree
of "danger" and the measures taken should depend upon several factors: the likelihood that personal satisfaction is the primary purpose,
the amount of personal expenses that will be deducted if no measures
are taken, the risk of stifling business decisions if a deduction is disallowed, and the degree of administrative difficulty caused by handling
each situation on a case-by-case basis. If the decision is made to allocate the expenses between a deductible and a non-deductible amount
instead of allowing or disallowing the deduction in full, the problem
is analogous to allocating overhead expenses among two businesses.
Recent legislation, providing a formula for identifying the personal
portion of transportation expenses on combined business and pleasure
trips, is an attempt to deal with the genuine dual purpose expense by
allocation when the element of personal satisfaction becomes too significant to ignore. 12 The occasional case which values a non-transferable benefit received by a taxpayer at less than the market value to
those who freely purchase the benefit is engaged in a similar effort.'3
The validity of the approach I have suggested for using "cause"
11 Compare Treas. Reg. 45, § 215 (1920) (excess over normal food expense for business
meals deductible), with H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921) (administrative
justification for § 162(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, which does not limit the deduction to the excess over normal food expenses).
12 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 274(c).
13 See, e.g., Reginald Turner, 23 P-H TAx CT. M M.
54,142 (1954).
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to distinguish between non-deductible personal and deductible business expenses can be tested by analyzing the problems in the recent
Sullivan14 and Tyne 5 cases involving the expenses of commuting by
car where business reasons justified transporting tools to work but
where the taxpayer would have driven to work in any event for personal reasons. The Tax Court held in both cases that none of the expense could be a deductible business expense whether or not the
tools could only be gotten to work by car and whether or not the commuter would have driven to work in any event for personal reasons.,
This was a clear departure from an earlier Tax Court holding in the
Kistler"' case that the excess over normal commuting expenses can be
identified as a deductible business expense if the taxpayer would not
have driven anyway for personal reasons. It is unclear, however,
whether earlier Tax Court cases allowed a deduction for some allocable
portion of the expense if the taxpayer would have driven even if there
had been no tools to carry. In the Crowther18 case, which the Kistler
court cited as establishing the allocation rule, the taxpayer would have
driven anyway since the only available transportation was by car.
Crowther, therefore, appeared to treat the expense as an allocable dual
purpose expense. Apparently, the Tax Court did not appreciate the
difference between the administrative problem of identifying the business portion of an expense and the allocation problem presented by
dual purpose expenses.
Before the Second Circuit in Sullivan, the Commissioner conceded
that the Tax Court erred in disallowing the deduction if the tools had
to be gotten to work and using the car was a reasonable method, so
long as the taxpayer could show that he would not have driven anyway
for personal reasons. 19 In such a case, the Commissioner was willing
to allow the entire deduction, in accordance with a 1963 revenue ruling,20 thereby avoiding the administrative problem of identifying the
excess expense made necessary by the business. However, for the Commissioner, the deduction of the entire expense depended upon the tax14 Lawrence D. Sullivan, 45 T.C. 217 (1965), rev'd, 368 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, -

U.S. -,

90 S. Ct. 72 (1969).

15 John J. Tyne, 35 P-H
1967), cert. denied, -

U.S. -,

TAX

Cr.

MEM.

66,214 (1966), rev'd, 385 F.2d 40 (7th Cir.

90 S Ct. 88 (1969).

16 45 T.C. at 221; 35 P-H TAx CT. MEat.

66,214, at 1249.

17 James A. Kistler, 40 T.C. 657 (1963), withdrawn 44 T.C. Errata page in front

of volume, referred to in Lawrence D. Sullivan, 45 T.C. 217, 219 n.2 (1965). This was
the approach taken to business meals in 1920. See note 11 supra.
18 Charles Crowther, 28 T.C. 1293 (1957), rev'd, 269 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1959).
19 368 F.2d at 1008.
20 Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 Cumt. BULL. 34.
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payer's proving that he would not have driven to work for personal
reasons and, in this case, the personal reasons for driving were apparent
due to the taxpayer's medical problems.
The court stated that the entire expense would have been deductible, as the Commissioner conceded, if the taxpayer would not have
driven but for the tools. However, the court held that the part of the
expense allocable to transporting the tools could be deducted, even if
the taxpayer would have driven anyway for personal reasons. The Second Circuit said that it was reinstating the old Tax Court rule requiring allocation. However, it cited both the Crowther case, 21 which
appears to treat the expense as a dual purpose expense, and a revenue
ruling22 in which the problem was the administrative one of identifying the extra non-deductible personal expense of taking a wife on a
business trip. Like the Tax Court, therefore, the Second Circuit failed
to distinguish clearly between allocable dual purpose expenses and the
administrative problem of identifying the excess over normal commuting costs. On remand the Tax Court allocated one-third of the
23
expense to the business and the Second Circuit affirmed.
In Tyne the Seventh Circuit also felt that an allocation was appropriate even if the taxpayer would have driven for personal reasons
and remanded the case to the Tax Court to determine the allocation.24
In this case, there were no medical reasons for driving but the taxpayer
would have driven to work even if there were no tools to carry. Although his reason for driving without regard to the tools might have
been primarily his need to use the vehicle on business once he got to
work, 25 this reason alone has never been enough to overcome the presumption that the commuting expense is a personal expense. A concurring judge seemed to suggest that allocation should lead only to a
26
search for the extra expenses over less expensive commuting expenses.
Perhaps he found this a convenient formula for allocating a dual purpose expense, although it is not clear how he would have decided the
Crowther case, where there was no method of commuting less expensive
than by car. Since his colleagues did not concur in his opinion, this
formula must have been found inappropriate as a guide for all sit21 The court also cited Francis Eaton, 27 P-H TAx CT. ME.
58,013 (1958), in
which the facts were essentially the same as in Crowther.
22 Rev. Rul. 56-168, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 93.
23 37 P-H TAx CT. MEM.
68,144 (1968), aff'd, 69-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9448 (2d Cir.
March 6, 1969).
24 385 F.2d at 41-42.
26 35 P-H TAx CT. MFm. 66,214, at 1248.
26 385 F.2d at 42-43.
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uations. Perhaps the majority viewed the rule that normal commuting
expenses are not deductible even when there are no tools to be transported as of questionable validity in view of current housing conditions
or because, as in Tyne, the employer might require the vehicle to be
used at work. The majority might then have reasoned that, while the
rule in normal commuting cases without tools is too imbedded to be
uprooted, a case-by-case estimate of the personal element would be
proper when a business element could justifiably be assumed to exist,
as in cases where tools must be transported.
After the Tax Court in Tyne found it impossible to do anything
but accept the Commissioner's fifty-fifty allocation on remand, the
Seventh Circuit tried to clarify its mandate. 27 First, it held that the
Commissioner's allocation is reviewable. 28 Second, it adopted the Commissioner's and the Second Circuit's view that the entire expense is
deductible if the taxpayer would not have driven to work but for the
tools.29 However, the court made the mistake of stating that the "but
for" rule established a "primary business purpose" test.30 In fact, an
expense which would not be incurred "but for" the business might
have only a business purpose, which could fall short of a primary business purpose. 31
The problems in these cases stem from the failure to understand
dual purpose expenses and to develop an approach for dealing with
them. First, consider the case of the taxpayer who would have driven
to work in any event other than for medical reasons even if there were
no tools to be transported. It is improper to analogize the expense of
the car to food expenses because, as already noted, there would be no
commuting expenses without work. The next question to pose in
deciding if the expense is a personal one is whether the car expense
is avoidable. If there are tools to be transported, however, the business
need to drive suggests that the expense is not avoidable.
However, our analysis of dual purpose expenses suggested that
expenses which are incurred only if there is a business and which are
not obviously avoidable might still contain a significant element of
27

Tyne v. Commissioner, 409 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1969).

28 Id. at 486.
29 Id. at 487.

30 Id. at 486. This error was foreshadowed in the earlier opinion and the Commissioner's attorney was apparently responsible. 385 F.2d at 41.
81 The recent dispute over the degree of improper purpose required before the
accumulated earnings tax would be imposed is an example of how tax results can depend
upon the intensity of a particular purpose in causing a taxpayer's decision. See United
States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 801, 307-08 (1969) (a tax avoidance purpose is enough
to attract penalty tax; need not be dominant purpose).
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personal satisfaction. In the abstract, it would seem that if the expense
would have been incurred without regard to the business requirement,
then it is a personal expense in its entirety. On the other hand, it seems
unreasonable to assume that an expense gives full personal satisfaction
if there is a business need to transport tools and the expense is not
incurred when there is no business. Furthermore, the weakness of the
rule that commuting expenses are always the result of personal choice
rather than housing conditions or the need for the car at work encourages a finding that some portion of the expenditure is a business
expense. Therefore, the Commissioner's offer to prove that the taxpayer would have traveled to work by car in any event is properly
rejected and it is more reasonable to treat the expense as resulting from
a combination of business and personal purposes.
While this approach is reasonable, and could even be adopted by
a court by citing the Cohan case,82 the question remains whether the
personal element is likely to be significant enough to warrant the effort
at allocation. The Commissioner argued before the Seventh Circuit
in Tyne that the allocation required by the Second Circuit in Sullivan
was a practical impossibility.33 Since the likelihood that the personal
element predominates is not great, the total amount of the deduction
is not great, and the administrative difficulty in reaching some allocation formula without extensive litigation is considerable, it might be
best to accept the taxpayer's view that the entire deduction should be
allowed where the business need as evidenced by the need to get tools
to work requires driving.
The view of both courts of appeals that a one hundred percent
deduction is appropriate if the car expense would not have been incurred "but for" the business need also supports the taxpayer's position. The expense is no less a dual purpose expense because, but for
the business condition, the expense would not be incurred. As noted
above, the "but for" condition is consistent with the business purpose
being only a purpose, not even the most significant factor in the decision.
If the allocation effort is not worth the trouble in these cases where the
element of personal satisfaction can be considerable, it is probably not
worth the trouble to litigate the issue of whether the taxpayer would
have driven to work but for the tools merely to be faced with the further
32 Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1980), in which reasonable efforts
were made to find the right amount of a deduction, is not limited to cases of administra54,142 (1954),
tive difficulty. It was cited in Reginald Turner, 23 P-H TAx CT- M s.
58,013 (1968), involving
involving prizes, and in Francis Eaton, 27 P-H TAX Or. MEM.
identification of psychic enjoyment.
33 385 F.2d at 41.
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troublesome question of how to identify the personal element in those
cases where the taxpayer cannot win on the "but for" issue.
A second question is how to apply this analysis if the personal
reason for driving is medical. Because proof of dominance of the personal purpose regardless of the business need is not difficult in these
cases, the result in Sullivan arguably should be to disallow a deduction for any portion of the expense even if the considerations outlined
above would lead to a one hundred percent deduction in the Tyne
case. On the other hand, medical reasons hardly give an individual a
a choice of whether to walk or drive. This observation goes beyond the
case of transporting tools to work and questions the disallowance of
the deduction for normal commuting expenses when there are medical
reasons for driving. This issue was resolved against the taxpayer with
very little thought.34 Perhaps the Sullivan case provides an opportunity
to take the first step toward re-examining the disallowance of normal
commuting expenses when medical reasons are responsible for the expenses.
II
EQUITY

The analysis pursued above assumes that in the normal commuting situation there is free choice of residence. Professor Klein suggests, however, that the easy assumption that people view the choice
of residence as a free one is probably inaccurate; thus Mr. Flowers
never really thought that moving to Mobile was a possibility.3 5
If I understand Professor Klein, he does not assert that because free
personal choice is psychologically absent, the expense is automatically
deductible because the need to get to work provides the dominant purpose. Apparently, psychic rigidity is a kind of personal motivation
which can support a conclusion that an expense is non-deductible if
further analysis reveals that there is still a psychic return. He suggests
that, once it is found that the choice is psychologically rigid, it becomes relevant to explore further to see whether the cost of commuting is only an added cost for the taxpayer, not associated with an
increase in personal satisfaction when compared with taxpayers with
lesser or no commuting expenses. 30 I gather that while free personal
34 John C. Bruton, 9 T.C. 882 (1947).
35 Klein at 877-78.
36 Id. at 888-90.
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choice would clearly indicate the presence of psychic return, its absence
37
does not conclusively demonstrate that there is no psychic return.
The search for psychic return, once psychological rigidity in personal residence decisions is accepted as a reasonable assumption, next
leads to deciding whether psychic returns from different residence
locations are likely to be equal and whether housing costs are not lower
where commuting expenses are high.3 8 Thus Professor Klein suggests
that the lawyer who lives in Aspen where the skiing is good and the
lawyer who lives in Chicago where there is a fine symphony and an
art gallery are likely to have equal psychic returns.3 9 While he asserts
the need for estimating whether housing is as expensive in areas far
from work as in areas close to work, he does not hazard a guess on this
point. 40 If empirical observation and rational estimates can verify these
assumptions, Professor Klein concludes that the commuting expense
41
is associated with no personal benefit and is only an extra burden.
It would, therefore, be analogous to medical expenses and casualty
losses which are deductible. 42 Professor Klein clearly recognizes that
psychic rigidity and psychic returns vary greatly from person to person
but suggests that, if one area such as residence location can be separately
analyzed with some degree of certainty, it should be separately dealt
43
with by the tax law.
Professor Klein admits that it is appropriate to maintain existing
rules if reliable information is unavailable. 44 But if psychic choice and
psychic return are so difficult to identify and so varied from person
to person, should an analysis which makes use of this approach be
adopted? The difficulty in identifying psychic satisfaction can be demonstrated in the context of commuting expenses.
First, many taxpayers probably have a psychologically free choice
in determining residence. Professor Klein's example of equal psychic
87 I should make clear that I do not understand Professor Klein to be basing his
analysis on a challenge to the assumption that housing conditions allow free choice, although it seems plain that non-deductibility is most vulnerable on this score. This observation about actual housing conditions, as opposed to the psychological attitude towards
residence choice, seems most apt for the urban poor, as Professor Klein notes at 896. This
would explain the deductibility of commuting expenses under welfare law (see Klein at
873-74 & 896), even apart from the obvious policy considerations against placing an
obstacle in the way of encouraging welfare recipients to work.
38 Klein at 888-89.
39 Id. at 887-88.
40 Id. at 889.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 888-89.
44 Id. at 896.
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return, i.e., the Aspen and Chicago lawyers, supports this conclusion.
The equal return in such cases often results from a free exercise of
residence choice. Indeed, the assumption of free choice was probably
the basis for disallowing a deduction for moving expenses by a "new"
employee before the law was amended.4 5 However, the more precise
question is whether there is a psychologically free choice to commute
or not after the work location is chosen. As a psychological matter, the
choice would seem free in many cases, especially when the choice is
between suburb and city.
Second, even if the choice is not psychologically free, the assumption that psychic returns are equal is likely to be questionable. As
noted above, the "equality" in the case of the Aspen and Chicago
lawyers probably stems from free choice. In the absence of psychological
choice, is it at all clear that residence in the suburbs lacks an extra
psychic return? I do not understand Professor Klein to say that if
there is psychological rigidity in choosing residence location, equality
of psychic returns necessarily follows. If there is not such equality, is
there not a significant likelihood that psychic returns are greater in
areas with longer commutes or at least that the assumption of equality
is highly questionable?
Third, if the psychic return does not vary, are housing costs the
same? While Professor Klein does not make an estimate, I would guess
that many younger suburban dwellers view the commuting expense
as one which equalizes their housing costs with the higher rentals of
those living closer to the center of the city.
However, there is a more basic objection to the proposed model,
even if psychic rigidity, psychic returns and housing costs could be
determined with the certainty required to make the model useful.
Why should we be willing to make the adjustment of taxable income
suggested by the model when we know that psychic rigidity and psychic
returns vary considerably for all sorts of consumption decisions for
different consumers? Consumer A may get fifty percent satisfaction
from his ten-dollar trip to the beach which his mother-in-law insists
on but full satisfaction from his ten-dollar dinner at a restaurant;
Consumer B may have the reverse experience; Consumer C might get
his twenty-dollars' worth. Neither beach nor restaurant expenditures
will yield the certain conclusions about consumer satisfaction required
by Professor Klein's model, but Consumers A and B have received less
than twenty-dollar satisfaction because, as individuals, their circum45 Willis G. Ferebee, 39 T.C. 801, 805 (1963) (Opper, J., concurring). Section 217 of
the Internal Revenue Code now authorizes a deduction for moving expenses.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:390

stances varied from Consumer C's. I cannot see why the ability to reach
reasonable conclusions about psychic satisfaction in the context of
residence location expenses (if that is possible) argues for a deduction
of the commuting expenses, when taxpayers have similar but unidentifiable experiences of making expenditures yielding little or no psychic
satisfaction in contexts in which generalizations about the expenditures are impossible.

46

I do not mean to suggest that the likelihood of psychic satisfaction
should never be considered. My earlier analysis dealing with "cause"
made considerable use of this concept. This effort seems to me to be
necessary whenever the personal element might be significant in incurring any expense which might also have a business motive. If the
likelihood that there is personal satisfaction is not considered, the risk
that personal consumption habits will be converted into deductible
business expenses will be too great; the tax system will create irresistible pressures toward fringe benefits. 47 But I do not think Professor
Klein is arguing for the use of his model only in the context of expenses, such as commuting expenses, which would be deductible business expenses if the failure to avoid them is not associated with personal
satisfaction. He seems to suggest that personal satisfaction is a useful
criterion for judging the equity of a provision even in those cases
where there is no problem of preventing the disguising of personal
expenses as business expenses. In my view, this effort is too fraught
with uncertainty to be useful and too likely to discriminate against
taxpayers whose psychic returns are lower than others' in respect to
expenditures for which no reliable generalizations are possible.
Professor Klein suggests that the current deductions for medical
expenses and casualty losses are supportable on the basis of his analysis. 48 This seems to me to have undesirable consequences. It is probably no accident that the deductions that have been allowed where
psychic satisfaction is likely to be low also involve situations where
governmental transfer payments are significant. 49 Indeed, Medicare
has caused the medical expense deduction for aged taxpayers to be
46 Professor Klein makes the argument for separate treatment of expenses related to
residence locations. Klein at 888.
47 There is already evidence that a significant amount of national income is fringe
benefits. See Yerman, Fringe Benefits: Tax Shelter for the Working Man, 1 COLUm. J. oF
LAw AND Soc. PROB. 56 (1965).
48 Klein at 889.
49 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395, 1396 (Supp. I, 1966) (Medicare and Medicaid); id. §§ 1855-1855(g)
(1964) (disaster relief).
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401

reduced.5 0 However, if the low level of psychic satisfaction in these two
situations is elevated to independent significance and sanctified by the
label of "equity" despite the role of these deductions as "tax subsidies,"
decisions to allow deductions for expenses that lack the same urgency
when viewed as subsidies might be encouraged. For example, it might
be appropriate to re-examine the "subsidy" aspects of the casualty
loss deduction, which provides free insurance to many taxpayers whose
protection against losses should perhaps be left to private insurance.
Such an effort might be thwarted if the casualty loss deduction were
considered grounded in equitable considerations.
50 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 213(a), (b), as amended, 26 U.S.C. §§ 213(a), (b) (Supp.
IV, 1969).

